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This thesis analyzes the Czech brewing industry by describing its structure, re-
cent development, and social and economic impacts on the society as a whole.
The aim is to empirically estimate the optimal level of beer tax, which would
balance both social costs and benefits of beer production. For this purpose, we
use a model determined by both externality corrections and fiscal considera-
tions as the tax increase is assumed to immediately change other governmental
policies such as labor taxation or medical expenditures. The results of our
analysis show that under most of the sets of parameters, the current tax rate
on beer is under its optimal level and that the fiscal component has a significant
impact on the optimal level of tax.
Keywords Alcohol, Beer, Brewing industry, The Czech Re-





Tato práce se zabývá analýzou pivovarnictv́ı v České republice, podrobně popisuje
strukturu pr̊umyslu včetně jeho nedávného vývoje a zkoumá sociálńı a eko-
nomický vliv pit́ı piva na celou společnost. Ćılem je empiricky odhadnout
optimálńı úroveň zdaněńı piva, která by vyrovnávala společenské náklady a
zisky plynoućı z jeho produkce. Za t́ımto účelem je použit model, který kromě
vyrovnáńı těchto externality zohledňuje také rozvahy o fiskálńı politice, protože
předpokládané zvýšeńı dańı ovlivńı i jiné oblasti vládńı politiky jako jsou
výdaje za zdravotnictv́ı a daň z př́ıjmu. Výsledky analýzy pro většinu soubor̊u
parametr̊u ukazuj́ı, že současná úroveň zdaněńı piva je pod svoj́ı optimálńı
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Kĺıčová slova Alkohol, Celospolečenské náklady, Daň,
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Czech brewing has a long history and tradition. Beer has always been an im-
portant part of the Czech culture having a very special position among other
commodities, which can be illustrated by the fact that Czech Republic has the
highest beer consumption per capita in the world. Excessive beer production
and exports together with tourists coming to our country to taste “the famous
Czech beer” contribute to the Czech economy with a considerable amount of
money, however, beer consumption is also connected with social costs including
health problems, loss of labor productivity and drunk driving. Public policy’s
target should therefore be at least equilibration of these positive and negative
effects. Taxation of beer seems to be an appropriate means of reducing so-
cial costs of beer consumption. This thesis presents an empirical estimate of
optimal level of tax on beer for the Czech Republic, accounting for both exter-
nalities and how policies interact with the broader fiscal system.
For the description of Czech and world beer production and its recent develop-
ment, we use the latest statistical data from Research Institute of Brewing and
Malting and Czech Statistical Office. Various institutions and organizations
such as World Health Organization or Institute of Alcohol studies in London
focus on studying the negative effects of alcohol consumption on society. In this
paper we work mainly with findings of Anderson and Baumberg (2006) who
describe both tangible and intangible costs of alcohol created by the society.
The relationship between smoking and beer consumption has been subject of
many studies, e. g. Decker and Schwartz (2000), Tauchmann et al. (2006) and
Cameron and Williams (2001) concluding that cigarettes and beer are com-
plements, which further increase the harms of beer consumption. Among the
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most recent studies of beer production benefits we should mention the report
of Brewers of Europe by Berkhout et al. (2013), analyzing the contribution of
beer industry to European economy.
Previous literature examining the appropriate level of alcohol taxes focuses
mainly on measuring externalities. The most recent Czech study by Janda and
Mikolasek (2011) is an example of such a study, proposing beer prices that
would maximize the welfare of Czech society using similar approach as Pogue
and Sgontz (1989). In contrast to Parry et al. (2009) who has considered both
externality and fiscal rationales simultaneously. According to their findings, the
fiscal component of the optimal alcohol tax may even exceed the externality-
correcting component, strengthening the need for higher alcohol taxes. This
paper applies an almost identical model, however neither optimal tax with in-
creased public spending nor drunk-driving penalties are estimated. We came
to similar conclusions to Parry et al. (2009): under most sets of parameters,
beer taxes should slightly increase and the fiscal component of the optimal tax
is positive and quantitatively important.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a general introduction
to the topic by taking a look at Czech beer statistics in the world context and
describing the structure, characteristics and recent development of the brewing
industry. In Chapter 3, social costs and benefits of beer production are dis-
cussed in detail, the main result being the need of balancing both of these effects
by appropriate tax rate. In the following chapter, Chapter 4, two different theo-
retical models for calculation of the optimal alcohol tax are be presented, using
an analogy to methods developed by Parry et al. (2009) and Pogue and Sgontz
(1989). In Chapter 5, first of these models is being parametrized using Czech
data and a set of parameters. Chapter 6 presents the results of our simulation
and compares them with previous literature, namely the second model earlier
described. The closing chapter, Chapter 7, contains a summary of the study
and suggestions for future work.
Chapter 2
Structure and Concentration of
Czech Beer Industry
2.1 Statistics and Comparison in World Context
Beer is undoubtedly a worldwide spread beverage. In 2012, world’s beer pro-
duction exceeded 190 million kiloliters, which makes it one of the most popular
drinks. Brewing is traditionally connected with particular regions, namely a
plenty of European countries - Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands and especially the countries of Central Europe - Germany, Aus-
tria, Slovakia and least but not last the Czech Republic, however times are
changing. Today the largest beer-producing region in the world is Asia. Top
10 of the biggest beer producers surprisingly mainly consists of countries which
are historically less associated with brewing, though their beer production ex-
ceeds many countries listed above – mentioning for example China, the world
leader in both beer production and consumption. Another interesting example
is Brazil, which have experienced a production growth in many sectors, includ-
ing brewing industry. For the list of biggest beer producers and consumers see
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
2. Structure and Concentration of Czech Beer Industry 4
Table 2.1: World Leaders in Beer Production





1 China 44 348 100 23.3%
2 USA 22 952 295 12%
3 Brazil 13 400 000 7%
4 Russia 9 740 000 5.1%
5 Germany 9 461 800 5%
6 Mexico 8 250 000 4.3%
7 Japan 5 590 845 2.9%
8 UK 4 204 900 2.2%
9 Poland 3 780 000 2 %
10 Spain 3 300 000 1.7%
... ... ... ...
24 Czech Republic 1 861 100 1%
World total 190 700 940 100%
Source: http://www.kirinholdings.co.jp
Table 2.2: World Leaders in Beer Consumption
Global Consumption by Country in 2012
Country Volume Consumed
( kl)
Share in the Global
Market
1 China 44 201 000 23.6%
2 USA 24 186 000 12.9%
3 Brazil 12 800 000 6.8%
4 Russia 10 560 000 5.6%
5 Germany 8 630 000 4.6%
6 Mexico 6 890 000 3.7%
7 Japan 5 547 000 3%
8 UK 4 319 000 2.3%
9 Poland 3 790 000 2%
10 Spain 3 220 000 1.7%
... ... ... ...
21 Czech Republic 1 905 000 1%
World total 187 363 000 100%
Source: http://www.kirinholdings.co.jp
Regardless the fact that total beer production of the Czech Republic of 1.8611
million kiloliters and consumption of 1.905 million kiloliters did not make it
even to the Top 20 of world biggest producers (which is actually not so sur-
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prising given by the small size of the country), Czech position in the ranking
in production and consumption compared to the population is much better.
With 148.6 liters of beer consumed per capita in 2012, the Czech Republic led
all other nations in per capita beer consumption for the 20th consecutive year
(see Table 2.3). According to Berkhout et al. (2013), Czech beer production is
alongside Estonia proportionately the largest in the EU .
Table 2.3: World Leaders in Beer Consumption Per Capita
Per Capita Beer Consumption by Country in 2012
Country Volume consumed (liters)












First, let us divide breweries into two groups according to their ownership struc-
ture. It is important to distinguish between breweries and brewing companies.
The latTer term indicates a group of breweries possessed by the same owner.
An example might be Czech largest, world-famous brewing company Plzeňský
Prazdroj, owned by a British brewing company SABMiller, associating three
large breweries - Plzeň (Prazdroj, Gambrinus), Radegast Nošovice and Velké
Popovice Kozel. The second largest brewing company is Pivovary Staropra-
men, which is also in ownership of foreign brewing company named Molson
Coors. Altogether there were five brewing companies associating 18 breweries
on the Czech market in 2012, producing 15 101 961 hl of beer per year in total.
The brewing yearbook of RIMB states that there were 28 independent brew-
eries in the country in 2012, in which Budějovický Budvar was the largest.
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Together their yearly production was 3 486 086 hl, which corresponds only to
a quarter of brewing companies production. Micro-breweries are not included
in this category, we will talk about them later. Despite the fact that volume
of production of four smallest independent breweries have already met the def-
inition of a micro-brewery, we include them in this category too, similarly to
Frant́ık (2013).
The second possible way of categorizing breweries is classification by to the
volume of their production. Czech legislation recognizes only three types of
breweries – “large”(with production over 200 000 hl per year), “small” and
“micro”, which seem insufficient. For the purpose of this thesis, we divide the
brewing industry into five categories, listed in Table 2.4 below. In the following
chapters, we will analyze each of these categories separately.
Table 2.4: Breweries Classification - Production
Group Volume of production Number of breweries
Very Large Breweries Over 1 000 000 hl 4
Large Breweries 200 000 hl – 1 000 000 hl 4
Medium-sized breweries 100 000 hl – 200 000 hl 5
Small Breweries 10 000 hl – 100 000 hl 21
Micro-breweries 0 – 10 000 hl 177
Source: RIBM
The above mentioned classification takes into account the production of the
whole companies (e.g. the production of Plzeňský Prazdroj’s 4 plants counts
as a production of one very large brewing company). Number of microbreweries
fluctuates during the year, the specified number is valid to 12/31/2012. Alto-
gether, including micro-breweries and dividing brewing companies into individ-
ual plants (e.g. Heineken ČR counts as three breweries – Krušovice, Starobrno,
Velké Březno),there are 223 breweries in the country (without microbreweries
only 46), which is above average in Europe. The similar number of breweries
can be found in countries with a rich brewing tradition such as Belgium and
the Netherlands (both having 165 breweries) and Austria with its 173 brew-
eries. In the EU, the Czech Republic has the fifth largest number of breweries.
European state with the most breweries is Germany (1337), followed by the
United Kingdom (1113), France (503) and Italy (425). Most of the statistical
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data comes from the report of Brewers of Europe written by Berkhout et al.
(2013).
2.2.1 Very Large Breweries
This group consists of four market leaders – three brewing companies (Plzeňský
Prazdroj, Pivovary Staropramen, Heineken ČR) and one brewery (Budějovický
Budvar), although Pivovary Lobkowicz from the group of large breweries is
really close to the one million hectoliters limit. Together they produce more
than 75% of the entire production of the country’s beer industry.
The absolute Czech market leader is the brewing company Plzeňský Prazdroj
a.s., based in Pilsen - the city traditionally associated with beer. It includes
three breweries, each of them producing a specific brand of beer. The biggest
is Plzeň brewery, which manufactured 4 417 432 hl of beer in 2012 (RIBM,
2014). It includes two famous brands - the most popular Czech beer Gambri-
nus (http://www.sabmiller.com/) and the world’s most famous Czech beer –
Pilsner Urquell, the first Pilsner and the founder of this category of lager. Up
to two thirds of all beer consumed in the world is Pilsner-style beer, inspired by
the Czech original Pilsner (http://www.prazdroj.cz/). The second brewery is
Radegast in Nošovice, beer from Moravia with the yearly production of 1 822
958 hl and the last is Kozel Velké Popovice with 1 537 290 hl manufactured per
year. Besides the above mentioned brands, Prazdroj also produces low alcohol
fruit beer Frisco and non-alcoholic beer Birell. Plzeňský Prazdroj is a member
of SABMiller PLC., one of the largest brewers in the world with activities on
six continents. Altogether it supplies Czech and foreign market with 7 777 680
hl of beer (RIBM, 2014).
Staropramen Brewery in Prague, a member of Molson Coors Brewing Com-
pany is with its 3 160 163 hl of beer per year the second biggest beer producer
in a country. The company operates two breweries - Staropramen and Ostrava.
Another brewing company operating on the Czech market is Heineken - the
world’s third largest brewing group and the largest European producer of beer,
owning three domestic breweries : Starobrno, Královský Pivovar Krušovice and
Velké Březno. At present, Heineken Czech Republic is the third largest player
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on the domestic beer market with 2012 year production of 2 436 626 hl.
The only independent brewery in this category is Budějovický Budvar. This
national enterprise is strongly export-oriented: in 2013, it produced 1 424 000
hl of beer, of which almost half was exported abroad.
All of these beer producing companies have similar characteristics. They face
stable demand and operate on the nationwide market, mainly due to supermar-
ket chains that sell their products all over the country. Despite the changing
economic conditions (e.g. years characterized by economic crisis and a decrease
in consumption of beer) these breweries show long-term stability and very good
economic results such as stable production growth, compensating increase in
raw material and energy prices.
Table 2.5: The Largest Advertisers in the Czech Brewing Industry
Segmentt
Money spent on advertising/million CZK
Subject 2012 2013
Plzeňský Prazdroj 308.4 358.2
Pivovary Staropramen 138.3 226.7
Heineken ČR 217.5 156.4
Budějovický Budvar 80.0 100.4
Budějovický měšť. piv. 30.4 19.2
Rodinný pivovar Bernard 12.9 13.8
Pivovary Lobkowicz 6.6 8.5
Pivovar Svijany 0.5 4.5
Source: Admosphere
Other specific features of this group are promotions and advertising. To in-
crease sales and income, big brewing companies run a wide range of promotion
activities - from traditional commercials on TV or in magazines to promotion
of musical events and festivals and various sponsorship programs. Gambrinus
is, for example, an official partner of Czech football – the Czech Football As-
sociation Cup even has the name of the brand in its title. The money these
very large breweries spend on marketing and advertisement increase every year
(with the exception of Heineken, which has, on the contrary decreased its ex-
penses). As seen in Table 2.5, spending on marketing of all breweries from this
group differs significantly from smaller breweries.
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Every brewing company from the group of very large breweries has its domi-
nant brand that occupies more than a half of the entire production. Therefore,
a typical feature for the beer production of these companies is homogenization.
2.2.2 Large Breweries
In 2007, there were 11 breweries belonging to this group. Since then, the num-
ber has dropped to less than a half, mainly due to the fact that some large
breweries (Krušovice, Starobrno etc.) have become a part of brewing compa-
nies with a total production over 1 million hl per year. In 2012, the group
of large breweries consisted of two brewing companies and two independent
breweries with quite different characteristics. While the biggest one – Pivovary
Lobkowitz with its seven plants (Vysoký Chlumec, Platan Protiv́ın, Klášter,
Rychář, Uherský Brod, Jihlava and Černá Hora) and production of 970,000 hl
per year is expected to exceed 1 million boundary in the following years, the
production of the smallest one – Bernard, Humpolec (212 874 hl/year in 2012)
is just above the lower limit of this group. Another two breweries included in
this category are Pivovary Moravskoslezské Přerov, producing 757 492 hl per
year in their three plants (Holba, Zubr, Litovel) and Svijany, which brewed 595
363 hl of beer in 2012. Altogether, these four large breweries account for 13.5%
of Czech beer production.
Large breweries are heterogeneous even in the rate of their production growth.
While the production of both individual breweries has grown (Svijany around
2.2% and Bernard even over 6% in 2013), the production of both brewing
companies has undergone a yearly decline of approximately 2%.
2.2.3 Medium Breweries
The market position of breweries with production between 100 and 200 thou-
sand hectoliters is not easy. The overall share of beer produced in medium
breweries declined sharply in the last 20 years: from 17.1% in 1994 to 3.3%
in 2012. They are constantly being pushed out from the nationwide market
by the very large breweries, whose target is to leave only minor breweries with
local importance. And while there were 21 medium-sized breweries operating
on the Czech market in 1994, in 2012 the number declined to three.
For that reason, many breweries from this category had either increased their
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production and became one of the leaders or lowered their production and got
out of sight of the market leaders. Some of them have even completely ceased
their activity. Several breweries, as in the case of large breweries, became a
part of bigger brewing companies. Until 2010, the production of most of the
medium-sized breweries had been declining at an average rate of 2% per year.
In 2013, another two breweries – Krakonoš and Městský pivovar v Poličce
managed to overcome a barrelage threshold of 100 hl per year, so the number
of medium breweries increased to five in 2013. Simultaneously, all 5 medium
breweries have undergone a production growth. Pivovar Nymburk has experi-
enced the biggest one – between 2012 and 2013 its production grew by 18%. In
2012, the contribution of medium sized breweries to the state budget via excise
taxes was 83 874 000 Kč (RIBM, 2014).
2.2.4 Small Breweries
A typical feature for small breweries with barrelage below 100 hl is their focus
on the regional market. Due to their size, their production is concentrated on
one particular geographical area, usually centered around their plant. Their
market strategies include product diversification - their production, in addition
to classical lager beer, consists of various beer specialties such as fruit beer or
beer with higher alcohol content. Thus, it is common for small breweries to
produce more than one brand, usually around five. Another competitive ad-
vantage of local breweries is customer loyalty – local beer patriots often support
their favorite brand and create a relatively stable demand.
The overall share of beer produced in 21 breweries from this category is ap-
proximately 5%, contributing with and excise tax of 186 503 000 CZK. The
production of the four smallest breweries in this category is below the line of
10 000 hl per year, which would made them micro-breweries, however, accord-
ing to RIBM, they belong to this group due to some characteristics of their
production.
2.2.5 Micro-breweries
Micro-breweries have played a role on the Czech market during the entire his-
tory with an exception of communist regime, when they almost disappeared.
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The oldest and only micro-brewery that survived centuries of diverse political
regimes is Pivovar U Flek̊u, founded in 1499. The first boom of micro-breweries
occurred after the Velvet Revolution in the 1990’s when the trend of micro-
breweries was imported from the USA. The second boom arrived in 2004 as
the beginning of an era of annual increases in the number of enterprises, which
continues until today. In 1994, there were only 10 micro-breweries in country,
in 2000, their number had risen to 26 and continued growing, so there were 48
breweries in 2004 and 71 in 2007. At the end of 2012, the number of micro
breweries reached 177 (for the development of the number of micro-breweries
see Figure 2.1 ). The annual growth of number of micro-breweries is stable with
an approximate yearly increase of 20 breweries. Though the Czech beer mar-
ket has been already saturated for many years, the number of micro-breweries
is expected to rise until it reaches its equilibrium value of 250-300 breweries
(prediction of Czech-Moravian Confederation of Microbreweries).












































Typical Czech microbrewery is often a part of pub or restaurant. They are
usually located in smaller towns and villages, preferably close to some tourist
attraction, because tourists are (in addition to local patriots) an important part
of micro-breweries’ customer base. To attract more customers, micro-breweries
usually offer attractions such as the brewery tours and beer tasting.
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It is clear that micro-breweries operate on regional markets. They mostly pro-
duce draft beer which is then sold in their own restaurants or possibly sell
barrels to several other restaurants. Beer is bottled or even exported only ex-
ceptionally. Advertising is focused regionally (for example beer festivals), but
companies mostly rely on good brand reputation. Similarly to the group of
small breweries, the product portfolio consists mainly of beer specialties such
as strong beer, flavored beer, top fermented beer and especially not pasteur-
ized beer, which stores beer’s characteristic taste and is cheaper to produce,
but lasts fresh for a shorter period of time.
Undisputed disadvantage of micro-breweries is seasonality of their sales. On the
other hand, rivalry and competition among micro-breweries is not so strong, as
each of them operates in their own region. The higher cost of beer production
and lower productivity of micro-breweries is offset by the fact that they can
afford selling their beer at a higher price (thanks to higher beer quality and
manual production). In addition, the government favors them with lower excise
tax – while large breweries pay 32 CZK/hl, micro-breweries pay twice less, 16
CZK/hl. Despite their growing number, micro-breweries produce only 1% of
the total beer production of the country. In 2012, they paid 22 296 000 CZK
on excise tax.
2.3 Recent Development
During the past two decades, the production of an average brewery has experi-
enced an annual growth (Table 2.6). The size of the brewery with a maximum
efficiency of production appears to be much higher than the current average. In-
creasing share of beer production was manufactured in large enterprises, which
indicates industry shift to higher concentration.
Table 2.6: Development of Average Production per Brewery
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Source: Czech Statistical Office
Consumption per capita has been, unlike the average brewery size, quite stable
during the last 20 years (see Figure 2.2). It climbed its maximum in 1997 when
it reached the value of 161.6 l. Minimum of 144 liters was reached in 2010 as a
consequence of economic crisis, which was accompanied by a general decrease
in consumption. Since then, the consumption slowly increased again. Constant
consumption indicates that the Czech beer market has already been saturated
for many years and the only way for our breweries to grow is either expanding
abroad or eliminating competition by acquiring other breweries in the industry
or pushing them out of the market.
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Source: Czech Statistical Office, 2014
As a result of the economic downturn caused by the crisis in 2008, the Czech
Republic experienced a big increase in imports of low-cost beer, with a peak of
1.0 million hl of beer imported in 2010. Since then, the import has decreased
by 50 percent to its current level of 0.5 million hl. In 2012, exports overcame
an annual decrease, which lasted from 2009 and increased by 8% (see Figure
2.3) . Nevertheless, the current exports are still below the maximal exported
volumes since 2008. In total, about 18.7% of beer made in the Czech Repub-
lic is being exported, while Budějovický Budvar exports the highest share of
its production - almost a half. Most beer is exported to the EU countries -
our neighbors Germany (approximately one third of the exported amount) and
Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. From the remaining countries, the
most exports go to Russia, the USA and Canada.
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Table 2.7: Market Leaders
Company 2011 2012
1 Sab Miller (Plezňský Prazdroj) 43.42% 41.59%
2 Molson Coors (Staropramen) 17.17% 16.88%
3 Heineken 13.52% 13.03%
4 Budějovický Budvar 7.49% 7.15%
5 Lobkowicz 5.51 % 5.19%
6 PMS Přerov 4.2% 4.05%
7 Svijany 4.14% 3.17%
8 Bernard 1.7% 1.14%
others 3.37% 7.8%
Source: FORBES 2012 : Tržńı pod́ıly piovarnických skupin 2011, RIBM
Now we focus on an ownership structure. More than 85% of the market was
captured by the seven biggest companies in 2011(see Table 2.7). This ratio
decreased slightly in 2012, when it was approximately 84%. The industry
has therefore a relatively high concentration, which can be demonstrated with
2012’s Herfindal index of approximately 0.183 and Four-firm concentration ratio
of 78.65%. In 2012, a slight downturn in the concentration occurred, which
showed an increasing capability of smaller and micro-breweries to succeed.
Chapter 3
Beer and the Society
3.1 Czechs and their Relationship to Beer
An interesting probe into the opinion of Czech people on beer are results of a
research project called The pub and beer in the Czech society run by Vinopal
(2010). One of the most discussed issues in this report is a general public atti-
tude to an amount of consumed beer by Czech people and weather we should
be proud of this leadership. The results of this research have shown that the
number of people that are proud of our leadership (43%) has grown since 2007
(37%) and the number of people who are ashamed of that fact has, on the
contrary, decreased. This could be explained by the fact that people are glad
that we have, at least, a world first in some sector of industry. Systematic
educational campaign about beer benefits to the Czech economy and society
also helps to improve the public attitude to brewing, as brewery sector is sig-
nificantly export-oriented and the attractiveness of the Czech Republic as a
touristic destination is reportedly driven by the fame of our beer as the second
most mentioned thing, right after our historical monuments and cultural her-
itage. And while every Czech person drinks an average of 0.3l of beer a day,
foreign tourists drink 2 beers a day. According to Brewers of Europe, Berkhout
et al. (2013) the consumption of foreign tourists made 4% of total beer con-
sumption in the country in 2012.
The report also mentions a slightly downward trend in the Czech beer con-
sumption. Reasons of this decline might be a change to healthier lifestyle and
a decrease of number of heavy-drinkers. Another socially favorable trend is
therefore less beer consumed per person per night, but an increasing amount of
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consumers. The proportion of people drinking beer reaches values around 90%
for men and between 50 and 60% for women and does not differ significantly
according to categories such as age, education or income, however the biggest
beer consumers are men in older middle-age generation (45 and 59 years) who
drink five liters of beer per week. Slightly lower volumes of sales include the
youngest generation (18-29 years old).
Consumption of non-alcoholic beer is experiencing a long term significant in-
crease, mainly due to incompatibility of alcohol-drinking with driving or work-
ing, improving quality of non-alcoholic beer and last but not least, the expand-
ing number of places where non-alcoholic beer is available, whether bottled or
draft. In 2010, 53% of men and 26% of women said that they automatically
choose non-alcoholic beer if they can not drink the alcoholic one.
Another typical Czech tendency – drinking in pubs - has been changing as
well. In 2013, sales of bottled beer exceeded sales of tap beer in restaurants
and pubs for the first time. Czechs are beginning to reach the habits of their
western neighbors – for example in Germany only one beer in five is sold in
the pub or restaurant (http://www.pratelepiva.cz/). This change can be a sign
of recession (beer in bottles is significantly cheaper) and the lack of time for
hanging out in pubs – Czechs are saving money and time.
One of the well-known and generally accepted characteristics of the Czech beer
drinker is its conservativeness. This refers to his little willingness to experi-
ment with other kinds of brands, but also to other kinds of beer. Despite the
dramatic onset of microbreweries in recent years, the consumer of 2010 prefers
drinking one of the great Czech brewery’s beers in 53% of cases and only 40%
of interviewees prefer local beer. The selection of beer is for most consumers
affected mainly by its taste (it was considered as an important factor for 70%
of the interviewees), while advertising is regarded as a significant factor only
by 10% of drinkers. The question is to what extent the consumer is willing to
actually admit the impact of advertising on his choice of beer. The influence of
prices when deciding which beer to buy slightly increases. Consumer response
may be the shift in demand to lower-priced beers, mostly imported, which
might be regarded as a threat for domestic beer industry. This is related to a
question of confidence whether the brewing sector will continue successfully in
the international arena and to what extent we have to worry about the Czech
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beer. To that extent, a relatively optimistic long-term view of the public is
encouraging (CSMB, 2010).
3.2 Social Costs of Beer Industry
Even though beer consumption in the Czech Republic is closely linked to cul-
ture, social interaction, fun and leisure and revenues from beer sales bring a
considerable amount of money to the state treasury, drinking beer as well as
any other alcoholic beverage (and especially alcohol abuse) entails many social
costs. According to Anderson et al. (2012), alcohol is the third leading cause
of diseases and premature mortality in Europe (after high blood pressure and
tobacco, whose consumption is also linked to alcohol consumption, as explained
later) as Europe is the region with the highest alcohol consumption in the world.
Medical and health issues connected with alcohol consumption can be divided
into multiple groups. At first, there are various diseases and health compli-
cations happening directly to the alcohol consumer - both physical (cancers,
liver and cardiovascular diseases) and psychical (alcohol addiction, Delirium
tremens). Excessive alcohol consumption (which is related to risky sex be-
havior) also increases the risk of spreading of communicable diseases such as
HIV/AIDS. Other examples are various intentional and unintentional injuries
including suicides.
Alcohol abuse significantly decreases workplace productivity due to absence
at work and reduction of effectiveness under the influence of alcohol. On the
top, heavy drinkers often experience troubles with finding and maintaining a
job. Additional tangible costs may arise from drunken driving and alcohol-
originated criminality. Despite the fact that the Czech Republic has managed
to reduce the number of alcohol–related deaths on roads in recent years, driving
under the influence of alcohol is still very dangerous. The proportion of deaths
due to alcohol in the Czech Republic in 2013 was 8.97% (very negative is that
more than half of these accident were committed by a person with the content of
alcohol in blood higher than 1.5when the risk of accident is 22 times higher
than for sober people). The European Commission states even higher propor-
tion - according to their estimates alcohol is involved in more than a quarter of
deaths on European roads. (Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic, 2014)
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Beside the drinkers themselves, alcohol consumption harms other people as
well. This does not concern only injuries from drunken driving accidents and
street violence. Their surrounding suffers from divorces and domestic violence
and even complete strangers are harmed thanks to using government resources
for health care, unemployment and dealing with crimes connected with alcohol
abuse. Following Anderson and Baumberg (2006), intangible cost of alcohol
consumption (mainly to families) can even exceed the total sum of tangible
costs.
3.2.1 Relation between Beer Drinking and Smoking
In connection with social cost of beer consumption it is worth mentioning the
special relation between beer consumption and smoking. From my own ex-
perience there is a group of people who smoke only when they drink alcohol,
especially beer. The issue of complementarity of alcohol and cigarettes has been
discussed in many studies, although evaluation of this relation is extremely dif-
ficult.
Decker and Schwartz (2000) investigates cross-price effects in cigarette and al-
cohol consumption. An interesting finding has been reached. While increasing
alcohol prices lowers the amount of both alcohol and cigarettes consumed (im-
plying complementarity in consumption of these two goods), higher cigarette
prices tend to decrease smoking but increase drinking. Therefore this study
does not find enough evidence to prove whether cigarettes and alcohol are sub-
stitutes or complements, however, it proves that alcohol drinking may increase
people’s desire for cigarette. Complementarity of tobacco and alcohol was later
demonstrated by Tauchmann et al. (2006) using alternative instrumental vari-
ables approach and German survey data.
In the Czech Republic, the third most commonly used drug after alcohol and
tobacco is cannabis. Its use is widespread especially among young people –
almost one fifth (18.5%) of people between the age of 15 and 34 smoke at least
one cigarette of cannabis per year, which makes the young Czechs the biggest
consumers of marijuana in Europe (Annual report of European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2014). Therefore a study by Cameron
and Williams (2001) estimating the relationship among alcohol, tobacco and
cannabis might be really interesting when studying the Czech market. The
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results show some evidence for cannabis being a substitute for alcohol and a
complement to cigarettes and also for complementarity of cigarettes and alco-
hol.
Based on the studies mentioned above, we assume beer and tobacco to be
complements. Social costs of tobacco use are therefore tightly linked with beer
consumption. This assumption even strengthens the need for raising taxation
on beer. The issue of tobacco taxation is not an object of interest of this paper,
however, the optimal level of tax on cigarettes could be estimated using similar
methods to estimating the tax on alcohol, because both alcohol and tobacco
are goods with negative externalities. Review of the current Czech cigarettes
taxation policy can be found in Cnossen (2006).
3.3 Benefits of Beer Industry
Despite all of the social costs described in the previous section, the contribution
made by beer to the Czech economy is considerable. In 2012, total consumer
spending reached 79 279 million CZK and Value added to the production and
sales of beer accounted for 27 450 million CZK (0.8% of nominal GDP of the
Czech Republic). Note that this value consists not only of contribution of
breweries themselves, but also contribution by supply, retail and hospitality
sector, which even exceeds brewing companies direct effect. Czech government
also benefits from beer industry by tax revenues. In 2012, revenues from excise
duties, VAT and income-related contributions related to Czech beer produc-
tion and sales reached approximately 28 506 million CZK, which is even more
than back in 2008. Among other causes, this increase can be explained by two
percent rise in the VAT rate since 2008. More than a half of this amount was
accounted by revenues from VAT.
Besides the direct contribution to government revenues, we remark a significant
impact of Czech beer sector on employment. Evaluating of this contribution
in money terms would be really difficult, so this study uses only the number of
jobs created for illustration. In 2012, the brewing industry directly employed
approximately 7 000 people. This direct employment accounted only for 11%
of the total beer-related employment of 63 100 jobs in various other sectors
(38 200 jobs in the hospitality sector, 12 800 jobs in the supply sectors and 5
200 jobs in the retail sector). All the estimates described in the last two para-
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graphs come from a report of Brewers of Europe by Berkhout et al. (2013). As
we needed the prices in CZK, these estimates are multiplied by the exchange
rate EUR/CZK for 12/31/2012 (25.14 Source : Czech National Bank).
Describing intangible benefits of the beer production seems to be much more
difficult. One thing is for sure – besides the country’s historical and natural
heritage, famous “cheap Czech beer” and night life associated with it is one of
the key tourist attractions of the Czech Republic, increasing country’s incomes
from tourism.
Pubs and beer drinking play an irreplaceable role in the Czech culture. While
in other countries people spend their time in cafes or restaurants inviting their
friends for coffee, Czech people meet their friends or business partners over a
glass of beer in pubs. Beer-drinking is also typically connected with meeting
new people and social moments such as parties and weddings.
Chapter 4
Modeling the Optimal Taxation
The empirical part of this paper focuses on estimation of optimal alcohol tax,
using an analogy to a method developed by Pogue and Sgontz (1989) (in Model
2) and Parry et al. (2009) (in Model 1). Both models are at first theoretically
described. Later, Model 1 is parametrized using values for the Czech Republic.
Finally, estimated optimal taxes are compared to results of parametrization of
Model 2 by Janda et al. (2010).
4.1 Literature Review
Prior literature, e.g. Manning et al. (1989) and Saffer and Chaloupka (1994)
usually focuses on measuring various externalities such as cost of drunk driv-
ing and medical burden and estimating of Pigouvian, externality correcting
tax. Kenkel (1996) concludes that alcohol taxation is not the only solution of
problems connected with alcohol abuse and that stricter penalties for drunk
driving together with higher public awareness of the health consequences of
heavy drinking might significantly reduce social costs arising from alcohol con-
sumption. Another study by Lyon and Schwab (1995) compares effect of alco-
hol taxation with respect to annual and lifetime revenues. Results of all these
studies agree on the fact that current alcohol tax rate is below its optimal level.
Pogue and Sgontz (1989) as well as previous authors focus on measuring
Pigouvian tax using partial-equilibrium approach, balancing DWL of taxation
due to destored consumption choices of moderate drinking against benefits
from reduction of externalities caused by abusive drinking. For this purpose,
the population is divided into several groups according to the level their alco-
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hol consumption/abuse. The result is either taxation near the present level or
higher.
Parry et al. (2009) in contrast with prior literature including Pogue and
Sgontz (1989) measures for both Pigouvian and fiscal rationales, presenting
an analytical framework for assessing the optimal levels and welfare effects of
alcohol taxes and drunk driver penalties, accounting for both externalities and
how policies interact with the broader fiscal system. Optimal alcohol tax is
decomposed into four different components - Pigouvian tax, Revenue-recycling
tax, Tax-Interaction effect and Productivity effect. This approach was intro-
duced earlier in the article of Sandmo (1975) who suggested that optimal level
of tax on alcohol may differ considerably from Pigouvian tax on fiscal grounds.
Empirical estimation shows that fiscal considerations can significantly strengthen
the case for higher alcohol taxes as the fiscal component of the optimal alcohol
tax may be as large as (or even exceed) the externality-correcting component.
Unlike Pogue and Sgontz (1989) individual beverages have different taxation,
varying in the fiscal component of tax. The results of analysis also suggest that
optimal levels of alcohol taxes in the USA are much higher than their current
level.
4.2 Model 1
First, we present the model whose structure is very similar to the one used in
Parry et al. (2009). This static general - equilibrium model with representative
agent assumes that agent’s future costs of addiction are internal and not un-
dervalued and that efficiency determines optimality of policy. Fiscal system is
highly simplified - it is financed only through labor and alcohol taxes and pe-
cuniary penalties. Regarding this, the fiscal component of the optimal alcohol
tax in our analysis might be undervalued.
Preferences
Let us assume that the agent, representing an aggregation over all households
in the real economy, has continuous, quasi-concave utility function:
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U = U(A,D, τDD,C, l, G
P , H) (4.1)
H = H(A,D,D,M) (4.2)
In (4.1) all variables are expressed on a per capita basis and the bar label
variable is exogenous to our agent. U is a function increasing in all arguments
except τDD and H. Agent can arbitrarily choose the consumed level of alcohol
A and non-alcoholic goods C, number of driving trips under the influence of
alcohol D and leisure time l. τD denotes non-pecuniary penalties (e. g. license
suspensions, jail) per drunk-driver trip. GP is government spending on public
goods and H health risks, further explained in the next paragraph.
Health risks H comprise risks of becoming ill, injured, disabled or killed due
to heavy-drinking or alcohol-involved traffic incident. These risks are defined
in (4.2) by the continuous, quasi-concave function, increasing in agent’s own
alcohol consumption, drunk driving, drunk driving committed by others D
and decreasing in agent’s consumption of medical services M , as this mitigates
health risks and improves the chance of recovery.
Production
There are no pure profits on the production side of the economy because al-
cohol, general goods, medical and auto services are produced by competitive
firms with constant returns to scale. Therefore, producer prices are fixed and
firms pay a gross wage of w that is equal to the value of a marginal product
of labor. Effective labor supply is defined as W = wL where L is labor supply




The government pays for fraction s of medical care costs, while the rest 1− s
is paid for by private insurance and auto-insurance companies that cover their
costs through charging a variable payment amounting for the fraction υM of
medical expenses charged by insurance companies or υD per drunk-driver trip
charged by auto/insurance companies (υD < cD where cD is the expected cost
of auto repair) and also a lump-sum premium to households of KM (respec-
tively KD) . Insurance companies’ profits are zero in equilibrium because υM
and υD adjust and KM and KD are given.
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Government
The government faces the following budget constraint:
GP +GT + sM = tLW + tAA+ (tD − r)D (4.3)
The right side of the equation (4.3) describes three kinds of government spend-
ing - on public goods GP , lump-sum transfer spending GT and government
medical expenditures. These expenses are financed by revenues, which are de-
scribed on the left side. tL, tA and tD denote, respectively, a proportional
tax on labor income, a tax on alcohol consumption, and an expected fine per
drunk-driver trip. r = r(υD, tD) denotes resource costs expended by the govern-
ment from implementing drunk driver penalties is increasing in both υD and tD.
Agent optimization.
Agents face the following budget and time constraints:
(1− tL)W +GT = (pA + tA)A+ C +KM + υMM +KD + υDD + tDD
T (H) = L+ l
(4.4)
In the first equation, net of tax labor income and the government transfer
spending equal expenditures on alcohol (pA is the producer price of alcohol),
general consumption, lump-sum and variable costs paid to medical and auto
insurance companies and drunk driver fines . T is available time divided be-
tween leisure and labor, a function decreasing in health risks H.
The consumer’s maximalization problem yields the first order conditions:
UA
λ
= pA + tA +mpc HA
UD
λ
= υD + tD + τD +mpc HD
−mpc HM = υM Ulλ = (1− tL)w
(4.5)
In (4.5) we have normalized −UτDD
λ
= 1 , λ is the marginal utility of income
and mpc = −(UH/λ+ (1− tL)(wTH +WH)) denotes the marginal private cost
of health risks, which consists of direct disutility from suffering −UH/λ , the
value of lost time from incapacitation or premature mortality −(1 − tL)wTH
and forgone private earnings from lower workplace productivity −(1− tL)WH .
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It is seen from (4.5) that agents increase their alcohol consumption to the point
where the marginal benefit received from the last drinking unit is equal to the
tax-inclusive alcohol price and the own-health cost. Similarly driving under the
influence of alcohol is committed until the marginal benefit from drunk driving
equals the expected out-of-pocket expenses for auto crashes, (monetized) gov-
ernment penalties, and own health risks. Individuals also equate the marginal
private benefit from medical care with the variable cost and the marginal ben-
efit from leisure with the net wage.
In equilibrium, consumption and labor supply depend on the following reduced
form functions:
y = (tA, tL, G
P , GT , s− υM , cD − υD); y = A,D,C,M,L (4.6)
These functions only slightly differ from the demand/supply functions of the
representative agent, because they account for feedback effects from changes in
M and D on the equilibrium, lump-sum medical and auto premiums charged
by insurance companies.
Marginal welfare effect from an increase in tA
By totally differentiating the indirect utility function (see Appendix A for
derivation and definition of elasticities), we obtain marginal welfare effect from
an increase in tA, accounting for any changes in tL, G
T and GP to maintain
government budget balance.









EA = (1− υM)MA + EDDηDA/AηAA
ED = mpc HD + cD − υD + (1− υM)(MD +MD) + r − tD
(4.7)
In these expressions ηAA < 0 , ηDA < 0 are elasticities of alcohol consump-
tion and drunk driving with respect to price of alcohol, MEGGP = UGP /λ− 1
denotes marginal efficiency gain/loss from spending on public goods and EA
stands for the marginal external cost of alcohol consumption. Finally ED, de-
noting the external cost per drunk driver trip is gross of the non-pecuniary
penalty τD, which implies that the optimal level of alcohol taxes will be in-
dependent of the level of non-pecuniary penalties. This is further explained
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by Figure 4.1, which shows deadweight losses under the drunk driver demand
curve from the drunk driver penalties tD + τD. Deadweight losses from drunk
driver penalties include, in addition to the traditional Harberger triangle from
the distortion of demand also the first-order utility loss from the non-pecuniary
penalty (the rectangle τDD ), which is not compensated by a revenue to the
government. If alcohol taxes increase, demand curve shifts to the right and sub-
sequently deadweight loss increases by tD per unit reduction in D (the black
rectangle in Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Deadweight Losses from Drunk Driver Penalties
Source: Based on figure by Parry et al. (2009)




















By totally differentiating (4.6) we divide the change in effective labor supply
into three components - the increase in workplace productivity due to the ef-
fect of lower alcohol consumption on reducing illness or road injuries, the labor
supply effect of raising the price of alcohol relative to leisure and the effect of
revenue recycling (leisure is a normal good, so if we use revenues to decrease
tL, labor supply increases and it decreases if we use it to increase G
T ).
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Optimal tax with revenue neutrality.
Through the optimization, it is assumed that the government’s goal is to max-
imize the utility of agent by finding the optimal level of ta, given the level of
GT and GP and keeping the budget balanced when using all the revenues to
reduce the labor tax tl. From the first equation in (4.7) and (4.8) we calculate
the optimal alcohol tax (see derivation in Appendix A):
tA∗ = PV A +RRA − TIA + PRA
Where :

























gA = sMA + {s(MD +MD) + (r − tD)}DηDA/AηAA
(4.10)
ηAl denotes the elasticity of demand for alcohol with respect to the price of
leisure (or household wage), εLL > 0 is the labor supply elasticity, ηLI < 0 is
the income elasticity of labor supply and c denotes a compensated elasticity
(all elasticities are defined in Appendix A). In equation (4.10), MEGtl > 0 is
the efficiency gain from using a dollar of revenue to cut the labor tax.
It is seen from (4.9) that the optimal alcohol tax consists of four components
- the marginal external cost of alcohol consumption EA and three other com-
ponents that arise from various fiscal interactions.
PV A (or EA) is the Pigouvian tax, the marginal external cost of alcohol (for
the detailed formula, see 4.7 ). These costs are divided into two parts - first
is the fraction of medical costs due to the health risks from alcohol consump-
tion paid by third parties (government and insurance companies). The second
component accounts for drunk-driver trip costs.
The first extra component is the revenue - recycling tax ( RRA), that captures
changes in both tax revenues and alcohol-related public expenditure induced
by alcohol tax. It is equal to MEGtl times marginal revenue to the government
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from raising the alcohol tax, including indirect savings in government medical
and resource expenditures gA. Regarding the role of price elasticity of alcohol
demand: the lower it is, the greater the tax revenue from alcohol taxation, as
well as the revenue - recycling component.
The second extra component TIA is the tax - interaction effect which arises
from change in labor supply as the alcohol price rises relative to the price
of leisure, multiplied by 1 + MEGtL to account for the change in labor tax
revenue. To maintain the government revenue balanced, tL must be changed.
When alcohol and leisure are complements (ηAl
C < 0), the alcohol tax increases
the labor supply and the tax - interaction effect is positive. It also includes the
income effect from higher alcohol prices, which reduces labor supply because
leisure is a normal good (ηLI < 0). If alcohol and leisure were substitutes
(ηAl
C > 0), the alcohol tax would decrease both labor supply and labor tax
revenue, which implies the negativity of the tax - interaction effect.
We assume that alcohol is a relative complement for leisure, otherwise there
would be a downward adjustment to the optimal alcohol tax and therefore no
need for higher alcohol taxes.
Finally, third component is productivity effect (PRA), expressed in per unit
reduction in alcohol consumption. Taxing alcohol reduces drinking and also
drunk driving, resulting in better health of individuals and positive effect on
effective labor supply. It equals the health-induced increase in productivity per
unit reduction in alcohol −WHHA = (∂W/∂H)(dH/dA) times the labor tax
tL, times 1 + MEGtL to account for the change in labor tax revenue.
Taxation of individual beverages
Now, let us assume that:
A = A(ABE + AWI + ASP )
EAi = EA HAi = HA
(4.11)
where A is a weakly quasi-concave function of individual beverages: beer (BE),
wine (WI) and spirits (SP ). The second equation indicates that marginal ex-
ternal costs EAi and productivity effects HAi per alcohol unit are the same
across these beverages.
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We calculate optimal taxes on these individual beverages as :







where i, k = BE,WI, SP and ηii ηki denote own and cross - price beverage
elasticities. ti∗ is the optimal tax in the absence of cross-price effects among
beverages and is analogous to that in (4.9). Therefore if a beverage is more
elastic and complementary to leisure, the optimal tax on it is likely to be higher.
4.3 Model 2
The second model we use is based on the one represented by Pogue and Sgontz
(1989). We assume that the beer industry is a competitive industry where con-
stant price P equals long run marginal cost and beer is a homogenous product.
The basic model divides the entire population of N beer consumers into two
groups - abusers NA and non-abusers NN , so that consumption by moderate
drinkers results in no externality costs, whereas consumption by abusers does.
These two groups of consumers also have different demand curves Da and Dn,
where demand of abusers is higher and perhaps less elastic. We define a func-
tion of marginal external abuse cost E, which is a positive function of beer
consumption x, because marginal cost in the lower levels of consumption are
negligible, but increase with higher alcohol consumption. Abstracting from the
issue of different beverage types to illustrate, the problem of setting the optimal
alcohol tax can be understood by considering Figure 4.2 .
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Figure 4.2: Model with External Costs and Dead Weigh Losses
Source: Janda et al. (2010), based on figures by Pogue and Sgontz (1989)
In Figure 4.2, each non-abuser consumes xn, imposing no external costs on so-
ciety. On the other hand, extensive consumption of abusers xa creates positive
external costs to society. Optimal solution to this situation would be imposing
tax only on the originators of the externality (it is, in fact, a case of Pigou-
vian tax), which is in reality quite difficult or rather impossible. Therefore, we
impose unity tax T levied on all consumption and quantity consumed by both
groups falls to xa
1 and xn
1 (unfortunately imposing this tax damages also the
welfare non-abusers).
Welfare gain










This equation contains three components - the gain from lowering the external
abuse costs (area a+b), the welfare loss of abusers (area b) and the welfare
loss of non-abusers (area c). ∆xi = xi
1 − xi, i = a, n denotes reduction in
individual demand caused by the tax.
For simplification, we introduce E∗, denoting the marginal external abuse cost
averaged over the change in abusive consumption ∆xa. Let Xa = xa Na,
Xn = xn Nn be the total alcohol consumption by whole abusers and non-
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abusers group respectively.
Assuming that prices increase exactly by the amount of tax T , we calculate












Substituting (4.14) in (4.13) gives the following simplified version of the model
:
W =






















Solving equation (4.16) with respect to T/P , assuming εa 6= 0 gives the ad-











In reality, there are probably more than just two groups of alcohol users. It
seems unfair to put a student, who occasionally gets drunk with friends and
an uneducated misfit, who spends all days in the pub to the same category.
Assuming that we know price elasticities and marginal external costs of k group













In this section, parameter values from Model 1 are described. All values were
estimated for 2012 if not stated otherwise. For important parameters that are
uncertain, we usually consider three different values to obtain the mid, low
(conservative) and high (non-conservative) estimates. We allow a ±30% varia-
tion to find the lower and upper limit.
5.1 Alcohol Market and Labor Tax
To calculate the total consumption of pure alcohol (or ethanol) in the
Czech Republic, we first need to find out how many liters of pure alcohol were
contained in the amount of beer, wine and spirits consumed (computed in Ta-
ble 5.1).











Beer 148.6 l/year 4.5% 6.687 l/year 57%
Wine 19.8 l/year 12% 2.376 l/year 20.2%
Spirits 6.7 l/year 40% 2.68 l/year 22.8%
Source: Own calculation based on Czech Statistical Office data
Initial alcohol consumption A is thus 11.743 l of pure ethanol per capita per
year, which means 123 365 440,6 l of pure alcohol in total at the 2012 popula-
tion level of the Czech Republic of 10 505 445 people (CSO, 2012).
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The average price of one liter of beer, wine and spirits, taken from Budget
Household Survey data from 2012 reaches 24.3 CZK, 66.18 CZK and 246.21
CZK respectively, where the average price of beer was calculated by multiply-
ing the average price of bottled beer 20.24 CZK and the average price of draft
beer 40.22 CZK by the rate of their occurrence (52.2% and 47.8%, RIBM 2014).
The price of wine was similarly counted with both red and white wine and the
price of spirits with two Czech most popular ones – vodka and rum.
For the purpose of our analysis we do not need to know the price of a liter
of the particular drink, but the price of an accurate amount of the beverage
containing exactly one liter of pure alcohol (22.22 l of 4.5% beer, 8.33 l of
12% wine and 2.5 l of 40% spirits). These prices pa are 539.946 CZK for beer,
551.2794 CZK for wine and 615.525 CZK for spirits.
The current alcohol tax rate ta is calculated as the sum of excise tax
and VAT, which is the same for all the three kinds of alcohol – 21%, the basic
rate (VAT of 1 liter of pure alcohol in beer, wine and spirits is therefore 113.39
CZK, 115.77 CZK and 129.26 CZK). On the other hand, excise tax differs for
every one of them. For spirits it is 285 CZK/l, while for still wines, the excise
tax does not apply at all. Calculation of excise tax on beer is a bit more com-
plicated – it depends both on the size of brewery and the content of original
wart extract (details can be found in Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Excise Tax on Beer
Brewery size (hl of beer
produced)
Tax rate for 1% of original
wart extract in 1 liter
< 10 000 16 CZK
10 000 - 50 000 19.2 CZK
50 000 – 100 000 22.4 CZK
100 000 – 150 000 25.6 CZK
150 000 – 200 000 28.8 CZK
> 200 000 32 CZK
Calculating with the standardized rate of 0.31 CZK/l (over 90% of beer is being
produced in the breweries with production over 200 000 hl) and the average
11 degrees Plato beer, we get beer excise tax of 3.41CZK/l of beer or 75.02
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CZK/amount of beer containing 1 liter of pure alcohol.
Altogether, the current alcohol tax rate ta per liter of pure alcohol is esti-
mated to be 188.41 CZK for beer, 115.77 CZK for wine and 414.26 CZK for
spirits.
In 2011, the implicit tax rate on labor was 39% in the Czech Republic
(Eurostat, 2013). In 2012 real GDP was approximately the same and the gov-
ernment did not implement any new policies concerning income tax, so the tax
rate on labor was probably the same than in the previous year. Therefore in
this paper tL = 0.39 is applied.
5.2 Drunk Driving
In 2012, the Police of the Czech Republic recorded a total of 4,974 traffic acci-
dents caused by drunk driving. In these accidents, 45 persons were killed and
2,770 people injured. Alcohol in blood of drivers was also detected at 11,037
inspections of motor vehicles. Altogether there were 16,011 cases of drunk
driver trips registered in 2012. Nevertheless, this value represents only a small
fraction of the actual number.
According to data of the Ministry of Transport, drivers with a blood alco-
hol level higher than allowed amount account for approximately 2% of total
kilometers traveled within the countries of the EU. Assuming 10 000 kilome-
ters travelled per year per driver (GE Money Auto, 2011) , average trip length
of 20 kilometers and the proportion of drivers in the population of 64.62% (De-
partment of Transportation, 2006) gives initial drunk driver trips D of 67
886 186 with the proportion of registered drunk driving lower than 0.03%.
Expected fine per drunk-driver trip tD = 5.9 CZK is calculated a half
of the maximal penalty rate that can be charged in the Czech Republic for
driving under the influence of alcohol (25 000 CZK) multiplied by the number
of registered drunk driving, divided by real drunk driving.
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5.3 External Costs
Levitt and Porter (2001) estimate that only 16.8% of injuries in alcohol-involved
crashes are external. Applying the same ratio to alcohol-related fatalities in
2012 gives eight external fatalities and 471 external injuries. For fatalities, the
marginal private cost mpc corresponds to estimates of the value of life. Czech
Supreme Court assumes a value of life of 10 051 200 CZK , thus 80 409 760
CZK the estimated value of eight lives.
Estimating compensation for non-fatal injuries is more complicated. Under
Czech law, every injury or social impairment caused by a traffic accident has a
different value in points, on which amount depends the compensation. Value
of one point is 120 CZK. Averaging all these compensation gives a value of 72
000 CZK (that means 33 912 000 CZK for 471 injuries), which we set as the
marginal private cost mpc of non-fatal external injuries. Aggregating over the
value of fatal and non-fatal injuries and dividing by alcohol consumption gives
a value for mpcHDD/A = 0.927 CZK per liter of alcohol.
Based on data from the Ministry of Finance, we estimate the total costs of
auto repair to be 500 mil. CZK. In the Czech Republic, the car accidents costs
are almost entirely covered by mandatory car insurance. Average individual
financial participation reaches only 9% of the damage in each accident. Divid-
ing by alcohol consumption gives (cD − ηD)D/A = 3.68 CZK.
For the calculation of government resource costs from implementing drunk
driver penalties (including law, police and jailing costs), adjusted European
average data from Anderson and Baumberg (2006) have been used. Values for
the Czech Republic were obtained by multiplying European data and ratio of
Czech inhabitants in the EU (2.09%), ratio between average Czech and EU al-
cohol consumption (116%) the 2006 mid year exchange rate EUR/CZK (27.495,
source : Czech National Bank) and a conversion factor – ratio of CZ/EU pro-
ductivity of labour (49.6%, source: Eurostat) for the productivity parameters
and purchasing price parity ratio (79.3%, source: Eurostat). Estimated legal
costs of alcohol-related crime are 5 900 million CZK. Alcohol-related car inci-
dents are closely linked to alcohol-related costs of crime. Again using Anderson
and Baumberg (2006), we assume that alcohol-related car incidents accounted
for 88% of the previously mentioned amount, thus 5 192 million CZK and
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rD/A = 42.09 CZK.
Using again the European data, we could estimate medical expenditures con-
nected to treatment of alcohol related health problems to be CZK 6.7 billion.
This estimate includes costs of treatment of diseases caused by alcohol con-
sumption, own drunk driving and drunk driving of others. Unlike the U.S.
healthcare system, Czechs have most of the medical services paid by govern-
ment through their taxes. Variable payment υM (which consists mainly of cost
of medicaments) must therefore be lower than in Parry et al. (2009) and we
assume it to be 0.1.
All the above mentioned values give together EA = 106.93 CZK per liter of
pure alcohol. This value is the same for all the three beverages.
5.4 Elasticities and Marginal Efficiency Gain
Elasticities used to derive the optimal tax level are presented in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Applied Elasticities
Parameter Low Mid High
Drinking with respect to leisure
(compensated)
ηCAl 0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Labor supply with respect to income ηLI -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Labor supply with respect to wage
rate
εLL 0.15 0.15 0.15
Drinking with respect to alcohol
price - beer
ηAA -0.9715 -0.9715 -0.9715
Drinking with respect to alcohol
price - wine
ηAA -1.088 -1.088 -1.088
Drinking with respect to alcohol
price - spirits
ηAA -1.2104 -1.2104 -1.2104
Elasticity of drinking with respect to leisure ηCAl was drawn from Parry
et al. (2009) who indicates and interval between 0.1 and -0.2 and -0.1 is used
as mid value. In this case, using three different values is really appropriate
because of limited evidence on this parameter, which is more suggestive than
definitive.
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Own–price alcohol elasticities have been estimated in numerous studies
- among others, let us name Hogarty and Elzinga (1972), Gallet (2007), Foga-
rty (2010) and from the most recent ones Nelson (2014), Srivastava et al. (2014)
and Meng et al. (2014). Significantly less authors have also focused on cross
- price elasticities of alcohol beverages. In this thesis, we will use elasticities
calculated by Janda et al. (2010), based on the data from Czech Household
Budget Survey, presented in Table 5.4, which seems to be the most suitable for
our purposes, because the estimate was made relatively recently and was based
on data from the Czech market. It also focuses both on own and cross-price
elasticities. Therefore, we assume own–price elasticity ηAAof beer, wine and
spirits to be -0.9715, -1.088 and -1.2104 respectively.
We assume ηDA = ηAA based on estimated responses of drunk driving and
highway fatalities to alcohol prices.
Table 5.4: Alcohol Price Elasticities
Beer Wine Spirits
Beer -0.9715 -0.0681 0.0933
Wine -0.1143 -1.0880 0.0491
Spirits 0.2047 0.2302 -1.2104
Source: Janda, Mikolasek, Netuka - Socially Optimal Taxation of Alcohol: The Case of
Czech Beer (2010)
There is a vast amount of literature estimating labor supply elasticity. The
majority of them agree on the fact that it is inelastic. For the purpose of this
paper, we use the value of εLL = 0.15 analogous to Parry et al. (2009), which is
averaged over all male and female workers and hours worked. The latter gives
an outcome of MEG tl of approximately 0.106.
Finally, labor supply elasticity with respect to income ηLI is estimated.
It must be negative, as leisure is a normal good and it must also reflect
both alcohol-consuming and light–consuming households. We use the value
of ηLI = −0.1 that is also applied in both Saar (2011) and Parry et al. (2009).
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5.5 Productivity Effect
According to the estimates by Anderson and Baumberg (2006) from Institute
of Alcohol Studies, we could estimate total workplace productivity costs due to
the lower state of health of alcohol abusers and those that arise from increased
absence at work while influenced by alcohol consumption to be 4.7 billion CZK.
For the revenue-neutral alcohol tax this implies a productivity cost WHHA of
26.7 CZK - 49.50 CZK per liter of pure alcohol with a middle value of 38.1 CZK.
Chapter 6
Results - Optimal Taxation for the
Czech Republic
Results of the simulation are presented in Table 6.1, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 .
Table 6.1: Optimal Tax on Beer (CZK per liter of pure alcohol)
Components of alcohol tax Low Mid High
Pigouvian 106.93 106.93 106.93
Revenue-recycling 59.54 59.54 59.54
Tax-interaction 0 106.03 159.05
Productivity 11.52 16.44 21.36
Total 177.99 288.94 346.88
Current 188.41
As shown, the optimal tax rate for beer ranges from 177.99 CZK to 348.66
CZK per liter of pure alcohol with the mid estimate of 288.94 CZK. The low,
mid and high estimate of optimal tax (a sum of VAT and excise tax) on 0.5 l
of beer is therefore 4 CZK, 6.5 CZK and 7.8 CZK. While the low estimate is
slightly below the current tax rate of 4.2 CZK per 0.5 l of beer, both mid and
high estimate exceed the current tax level.
High estimate represents almost 200% of the low estimate, which seems to
be a reasonable difference. Individual estimates differ in Tax-interaction effect
and Productivity effect. The variability is caused mainly by differences in elas-
ticities of drinking with respect to leisure (from 0.1 to -0.2) applied to derive
low, mid and high estimates.
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Figure 6.1: Structure of Estimated Optimal Tax on Beer
















The most volatile component of the optimal tax is the Tax-interaction effect.
On the one hand, it completely disappears under the low estimate, because
under the given parameter values the substitution effect between alcohol and
leisure, which decreases the labor supply, is offset by the income effect from
the higher alcohol price that, on contrary, increases labor supply. On the other
hand, it represent almost the same proportion of the optimal tax as the entire
Pigouvian tax at the mid estimate. Finally, Tax – interaction effect under the
high estimate is so high that it represents over 45% of the total optimal tax
rate. The composition of the optimal tax is further described in Figure 6.1.
Similarly to results from the USA presented in Parry et al. (2009), the fis-
cal component (which we define by the Revenue-recycling component net of
the Tax-interaction effect) of the total tax rate under mid and high estimate
exceeds the Pigouvian tax. This fact highlights the need for both fiscal and
externality consideration. Productivity effects play only a marginal role in the
level of beer tax.
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Table 6.2: Optimal Tax on Wine (CZK per liter of pure alcohol)
Components of alcohol tax Low Mid High
Pigouvian 106.93 106.93 106.93
Revenue-recycling 52.75 52.75 52.75
Tax-interaction 0 86.71 130.07
Productivity 11.52 16.44 21.36
Total 171.20 262.83 311.11
Current 115.77
In order to obtain the optimal beer tax, we had to calculate the optimal tax
on wine and spirits as well. Alike the current tax, the estimated wine taxation
is the lowest from all the three alcoholic beverages. The optimal tax on wine
was estimated to be 171.20 CZK - 311.11 CZK per liter of pure alcohol with
the mid value of 262.83 CZK. After the recalculation we get 20.54 CZK - 37.35
CZK per liter of wine, thus way above the current level of 13.88 CZK.
Table 6.3: Optimal Tax on Spirits (CZK per liter of pure alcohol)
Components of alcohol tax Low Mid High
Pigouvian 106.93 106.93 106.93
Revenue-recycling 46.30 46.30 46.30
Tax-interaction 0 120.33 180.49
Productivity 11.52 16.44 21.36
Total 164.75 290.00 355.08
Current 414.26
The current level of tax on spirits is significantly higher than those on wine and
beer because of alleged higher social costs of its consumption. The results of
our analysis show that although the optimal level of tax rate on spirits is still
the highest from all the beverages presented, it is way below its current level
for all low, mid and high estimates. The value of mid estimated tax on 1 liter
of 40% spirit of 116 CZK represents only about 70% of the current tax.
The study of Janda et al. (2010) analyzes the recent development of Czech
brewing industry. Using methodology of Anderson and Baumberg (2006) and
statistical data about Czech alcohol consumption, an analogy of a model de-
veloped by Pogue and Sgontz (1989) is used to estimate the optimal tax on
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alcohol, balancing social costs and benefits connected with the beer produc-
tion and consumption. In order to maximize the welfare of society, alcohol
consumers are divided into two groups - abusers and non-abusers, differing in
volume and elasticity of alcohol demand.
Ranges of optimal taxes on each alcoholic beverage presented in Table 6.4 are
results of calculation with different sets of parameters, varying in level of ex-
ternal abuse costs (with and without intangible costs) and assumptions about
the number of abusers attributed to each alcoholic beverage.
Table 6.4: Optimal Tax Calculation - Model 2
Tax per liter of
ethanol(CZK)
Tax per liter of the
beverage(CZK)
beer 85 - 415 3.58 - 17.45
wine 56 - 416 5.67 - 42.43
spirits 43 - 284 17.14 - 113.67
Source: Janda et al. (2010) - Socially Optimal Taxation of Alcohol: The Case of Czech
Beer
Range of the optimal taxes calculated by Model 2 is generally wider than the
one from Model 1, particularly regarding the lower bound. The fact that all
the low estimates are much lower can be explained by the fact that the method
used by Janda et al. (2010) considers only externality rationales. Whereas in
Model 1, the highest tax is imposed on spirits (similarly to the current tax
rate), in Model 2, the tax on spirits is the lowest. The interval of optimal taxes
of beer and wine from Model 2 is a subset of the set of optimal values from
Model 2. Similarly to Model 1, the optimal alcohol taxes in the Czech Republic
seem to be higher than their current level.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Czech brewing is a quickly developing industry and an important contribu-
tor to both Czech economy and well-being of majority of population thanks
to its inseparable connection with Czech culture and a special status of beer
among other commodities. In spite of the fact that average production per
brewery gradually increases, Czech market has undergone a big boom of micro-
breweries, whose numbers are (unlike bigger breweries) still increasing. In 2012,
Czech beer consumption overcame a decline from past few years and started to
grow again, despite the reduction of consumption of draft beers in pubs which
was offset by an increase of bottled-beer sales, especially beer specials with low
alcohol content.
Regardless of numerous benefits of beer production, beer has unfortunately,
similarly to any other beverage containing alcohol, a negative external effect.
The scale of costs is very broad, including medical expenditures, productiv-
ity loss, drunken driving accidents and police and law costs. Social costs of
beer production are also connected with social costs of tobacco use as beer and
cigarettes are assumed to be complements. Alcohol taxes seem to be a suit-
able means of addressing these externalities. Using a static general-equilibrium
model with a representative agent we found that in order to find the optimal
level of beer taxation, which balances social costs and benefits, government
should set the tax rates between 4 CZK and 7.8 CZK per 0.5 l of beer. Our
analysis suggests that under most of the combinations of parameters taxes on
beer in the Czech Republic are lower than their optimal levels. On the other
hand, optimal tax was shown to be slightly under its current level when low
values were applied to parameters with a high degree of uncertainty. This
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implies the need for more empirical research on some model parameters. Be-
sides externality correction, these optimal levels are also determined by fiscal
considerations as increase of taxation is assumed to immediately change other
governmental policies such as labor taxation or medical expenditures. By de-
composing the estimated optimal tax into four components, we conclude that
the fiscal component significantly affects the optimal tax rate as it may be as
large, or even larger than the externality-correcting component. Apart from
taxes on beer, our analysis also estimates tax on wine of 20.5 CZK/l - 37.4
CZK/l and tax on spirits of 65.9 CZK/l - 142 CZK/l, which shows that op-
timal tax rates on different alcoholic beverages should vary according to their
characteristics.
In the future, this study could be extended by many different ways. As said
above, more empirical research on some model parameters (e.g. leisure cross-
price elasticities) is needed for a more accurate estimation of the optimal tax
levels. Similarly to Parry et al. (2009), we could estimate the optimal tax levels
decreasing public spending and increasing drunk driving penalties, as alcohol
taxes are typically justified as means of raising government revenues. Intangi-
ble costs of alcohol consumption such as pain or psychical harm to families of
alcohol abusers were not considered in our analysis - another expansion could
therefore include these in our model. Finally, a similar type of analysis might
be used to estimate the optimal taxes on other goods with negative external
effects such as tobacco and cannabis.
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Using (4.1) and (4.4), agents solve the following optimization problem:
V (tA, tL, I, G
P , D) = MaxU(A,D,C, T (H)− L(H, τDD,GP )
+λ
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Totally differentiating the government budget constraint (A.3) with respect to
tA, allowing tL, G




















Substituting KM = (1− s−νM)M and KD = (cD−νD)D (from the zero profit
A. Analytical Derivations II
condition for medical and auto insurance companies) into I = GT −KM −KD
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Let us assume that medical services can be expressed as a simple function of
alcohol consumption, own drunk driving and the drunk driving of others (as
these variables drive medical care demand through their impact on health):
M = M(A,D,D) .

























Substituting (A.7) and (A.8) in (A.6) gives, after some manipulation, equation
(4.7).
Deriving equation (4.10):
From totally differentiating the government budget constraint (4.3) with re-
spect to tA,allowing tL to vary with G
T and GP fixed using (4.8) gives :















































Substituting (4.8) and (A.10) into (4.7), with dGT/dtA = dG
P/dtA = 0 gives:



































where superscript c denotes a compensated coefficient and ∂L/∂I is the income
effect on labor supply.






where w̃ = (1− tL)w denotes the net of tax wage.

















Equating (A.11) to zero, and substituting (A.12) and (A.13) gives (4.9), where
gA is defined in (4.10) and elasticities in (A.14).
